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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A.

Issues

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) altered
its requirements for provisional release of detainees in 1999.1 Originally the court would
only allow provisional release of detainees under “exceptional circumstances”. This
“exceptional circumstance” requirement put an incredibly high burden of proof onto the
detainee, and granting of provisional release was the exception and never the rule2. The
modification of the rule came in 1999 when the ICTY dropped the “exceptional
circumstance” requirement, thus allowing qualified detainees to obtain pre-trial
provisional release. Following the ICTY’s amendment of the provisional release rule, in
June 2003 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) similarly revised
their provisional release requirements.
ICTR Rule 65(B) reads “Provisional release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber
only after giving the host country and the country to which the accused seeks to be
released the opportunity to be heard and only if satisfied that the accused will appear for
trial, and if released, will not pose any danger to any victim, witness or other person.”3
This memorandum’s focus is on the appropriateness of electronic supervision and ankle
monitoring in the International Criminal Tribunal environment, and specific feasibility in
the ICTR. Discussion revolves around viability of provisional release in the ICTY
currently and potential viability of provisional release in the ICTR. Recommendations
1

See ICTY Rules, Rule 65 (B) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

2

See Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Provisional Release of the Accused (Mar. 26,
1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]; Prosecutor v. Dukie, Case No. IT-96-20-T,
Decision Rejecting the Application to Withdraw Indictment and Order for Provisional Release (Apr. 24,
1996)
3

See ICTR Rules, Rule 65(B) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

1

for future ICT courts provisional release can be construed by comparing any future
tribunals to the different circumstances of the ICTY and the ICTR.

B.

Summary of Conclusions
1. The ICTR Cannot Provisionally Release Detainees with
Electronic Monitoring

Rule 65(B) of the ICTR permits the provisional release of detainees when the
detainee is able to meet the following three pronged test: (1) that there was a trusted host
country willing to transport the detainee back to the tribunal; (2) That the detainee would
reappear before the tribunal if released; (3) That the detainee would not pose any danger
to victims, witnesses or others if released. Provisional release is feasible only when there
are host nations available for the detainees to be transferred to. ICTR detainees who have
been acquitted on all charges have experienced lengthy delays before locating a host
nation; it can be inferred that those still facing charges would face even greater
difficulties in locating a hosting nation.4 In 2001 the detainee Bagilishema was acquitted
on all charges in June. The tribunals request for a nation to host Bagilishema was denied
by every nation until France reconsidered and accepted him in October, four months
later. Electronic monitoring requires authorities to monitor the provisionally released
detainee, so electronic monitoring is not functional without enforcement from authorities.
Without a hosting nation readily available, provisional release can not be granted to

4

See Prosecutor v. Bagilishesma, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Decision Acquitting the Accused of All
Charges and Ordering Immediate Release (June 7, 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
5]; Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, page 7, (2003) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]

2

detainees who otherwise would qualify.5 Detainees may be able to satisfy the courts
belief that they will return to trial and not interfere with any witnesses, but they can not
be granted provisional release without a country to live in. The tribunal must be fully
aware of where the detainee would live, and have assurances from a host nation that the
detainee will be monitored by local authorities and transferred back to the tribunal when
requested. Without the provision of a host nation, there is simply no where for a detainee
to be released to, and so provisional release can not be granted without one.

2. The ICTY Can Provisionally Release Detainees with Electronic
Monitoring
The ICTY detainees have many different ethnic backgrounds; as a result there are
many host nations willing to accept their detainee citizens. The ICTY must rely on these
hosting nations to ensure that the provisional release requirements are complied with by
the detainees. So far the ICTY has provisionally released twenty-four detainees; these
detainees are still awaiting trial but no serious complications have arisen yet.6 Electronic
monitoring and ankle bracelets have the potential to assist the ICTY in tracking the
location of detainees to ensure that they are indeed in compliance with release
requirements. GPS tracking bracelets allow the monitoring authorities to know the exact
location of the detainee, which would allow authorities to know if the detainees have had
any contact with witnesses or victims.

5

Without a hosting nation, and compounded by the lack of a police force, the ICTR must rely on
penitentiary detention for all detainees.
6
See ICTY at a glance Key Figures of ICTY Cases, available at http://www.un.org.icty/glance-e/index.htm
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]
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3. Future International Criminal Tribunals Should Compare
themselves to the ICTY or ICTR to Determine Provisional
Release Feasibility
The ICTR and ICTY are similarly purposed institutions with polarized political
circumstances which clearly demonstrate the different societal conditions in one of which
detainees can be provisionally released with relative ease, and the other of which
detainees can not be provisionally released due to technical issues. To determine whether
provisional release can be granted to qualified detainees, future International Criminal
Tribunals (ICTs) should compare the availability of a host nation for their detainees to
that of the ICTR or ICTY detainees. If they are similar to the ICTY, and have host
nations willing to accept the detainees, then provisional release is feasible. If they are
more analogous with the ICTR and have no hosting nations readily accepting the
detainees, provisional release is not feasible.

II.

Factual Background
1. History of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
During a one hundred day period from April 1994 through July 1994, more than

nine hundred Tutsi citizens in Rwanda were killed by the Hutu in Rwanda. The Tutsi
managed to rebel against the Hutu regime and seize power. In 1994 the United Nations
received a request from the Government of Rwanda appealing for the establishment of an
international tribunal for the purpose of prosecuting those responsible for genocide and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of

4

Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.7 Acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution
955 on November 8th 1994.8 This resolution authorized the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The Security Council expressed the desire to prosecute
any persons responsible for the violations of international humanitarian law, in an effort
to help national reconciliation and to restore peace. The tribunal was established to
prosecute those persons who were responsible for genocide and other violations of
international humanitarian law.
As of April 2006 the Tribunal has completed twenty six-trials, and released
twenty verdicts.9 There are currently twenty-seven accused detainees on trial; these
individuals were arrested between 1996 and 2002, and the majority of them were arrested
before 2000.10 Fifteen detainees are still awaiting the beginning of their trial; these
individuals were arrested between 2001 and 2005.11 The average length of detention for
detainees awaiting trial or currently on trial has been five years. One of the longest
pretrial waiting periods has been for the former Director of Cabinet for the Ministry of
Defense who was arrested in March 1996 and had his trial begin in April 2002.12 These
extended pre-trial waiting periods are the cause of much concern in the legal rights world.

7

See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR] General Information, available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
8

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), available at http://dacessods.un.org/TMP/9304360.html [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2 ]

9

See Status of ICTR Detainees, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]
10
Id.
11

Id.

12

Id.
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Many individuals have suggested the appropriateness of pre-trial provisional release for
these detainees who are waiting around in prison for so many years before being tried.13
Detainees are currently held in the United Nations Detention Facility, constructed
in 1996.14 The facility is located in the Tanzania correctional centre, which is only ten
kilometers from the Tribunal’s headquarters. The facility complies with international
prison standards and consists of eighty nine holding cells, “kitchen, medical facilities,
library, a classroom and a gym”.15 Currently sixty detainees are incarcerated within the
Detention Facility.16
In determining the practicality of provisional release, it is important to know how
much longer the detainees can expect to be held in custody. The ICTR currently plans to
finish up the tribunals function and complete its case load, if the tribunal can move
quickly enough the need for provisional release may be moot. The ICTR released a
completion strategy guide in December 2005 which states that by 2008 all trials will have
commenced, and by 2008 sixty-five to seventy trials will be completed.17 The Prosecutor
estimates that by 2010 the ICTR trial court will have completed all case work, and only
the appeals court will still be in session.

13

See Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, (2003) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]

14

See Detention of Suspects and Imprisonment of Convicted Persons The Detention Facility, available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factssheets/7.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]

15

Id.

16

See Status of ICTR Detainees, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]
17

See Completion Strategy of the ICTR, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/completionstrat/s-2005782e.pdf [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
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2. History of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
The ICTY was established in a different political context than that of the ICTR.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a strong uprising of national identities in
the former Yugoslavia.18 Yugoslavia was composed of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.19 In the early 1990’s the different ethnic
groups began to secede from Yugoslavia and form their own territories. Many thousands
of non-Serbians were expelled from Yugoslavia or killed as a result of the ensuing
struggle from 1991 up until the 1999 war in Kosovo.20 On May 25th, 1993, the United
Nations Security Council passed resolution 827, which established the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.21 The tribunal was established to prosecute
those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
former Yugoslavia since 1991.
One hundred and sixty-one defendants were indicted by the ICTY; forty-seven of
these accused are currently in custody within the United Nations ICTY Detention Unit
which is located within The Hague, The Netherlands.22 Twenty-three additional

18

See Yugoslavia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslavia; Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

See United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), available at http://dacessods.un.org/TMP/2097092.html [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3]

22

See ICTY at a glance Key Figures of ICTY Cases, available at http://www.un.org.icty/glancee/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]
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defendants are currently on pre-trial provisional release.23 Detainees have been
provisionally released on health concerns, or temporarily to attend family funerals. In
2006 the ICTY provisionally released Haradin Bala so that he could attend his daughters
memorial service.24 In 2000 the ICTY provisionally released Milan Simic, without the
“exceptional circumstances” clause, the tribunal accepted Simic’s request for provisional
release due to health issues.25
The ICTY has been in existence for over ten years, the need to complete the trials
has pushed the ICTY to establish a timetable for concluding the tribunals’ prosecution of
accused defendants. In 2002 the tribunal endorsed a roadmap which acted to conclude all
investigations by the prosecution by the end of 2004, completion of trial court level
proceedings by 2008, and completion of appeals court level proceedings by 2010.26

3. Provisional Release and Electronic Monitoring
Not only in the International Criminal Tribunals but throughout North America
and Europe the cost of imprisoning criminals has escalated substantially over the last half
decade.27 In the United States, prison overcrowding became such a problem that states
were ordered to relieve prison conditions.28 The US Supreme Court upheld a decision
finding overcrowding conditions in Alabama prisons to constitute a violation of the Eight
23

Id.

24

See Prosecutor v. Haradin Bala [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

25

See Prosecutor v. Milan Simic [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]

26

See Twelfth Annual Report (2005) of the ICTY, available at http:// http://www.un.org/icty/rappannue/2005/index.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
27

See Electronic Home Detention: New Sentencing Alternative Demands Uniform Standards

28

Id.

8

and Fourteenth amendments of the US Constitution. At least thirty nine states, including
the District of Columbia were ordered by the courts to reduce prison crowding. The
extraordinary costs of building prisons and maintaining them became too much of a
burden politically and economically for justice systems and their communities. As a
result many justice systems began to implement provisional release of defendants as a
method of managing the growing criminal population. Throughout North America and
Europe, provisional pre-trial release has become a common strategy to alleviate the need
for expensive prison space. Criminal offenders accused of and convicted for sexual
crimes, substance abuse, and robbery, are often placed on provisional release.29
Provisional release with electronic monitoring consists of varied monitoring
systems which ensure the released defendant complies with the orders of the court. If any
violation of the court’s instructions occurs, provisional release is revoked and the
defendant is placed back into the penitentiary system.
The various electronic monitoring consist of dedicated telephone systems
installed between the monitoring company and the defendant’s place of residence. One
automated system consists of a computer voice recognition system which will call the
defendant at random times throughout the day; the defendant is then required to speak to
the system over the phone.30 This is a highly advanced system which is capable of
distinguishing family members from the defendant, yet can still recognize the defendant
when he is ill with a cold. Alternative systems consist of a monitoring company calling
or physically checking up on the defendant periodically. This is a less technically

29

Id.

30

See Electronic Monitoring: What does the Literature Tell Us? (1998) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 13];]

9

sophisticated method, but serves the same functionality as the computer system. These
systems are highly intrusive to the family life of the defendant, and demand a lot of
participation from the defendant. The benefits are often perceived to outweigh these
taxations on the family life.
Another form of electronic monitoring is the ankle bracelet. Traditionally the
ankle bracelet consisted of a tamper proof electronic tag placed around the defendant’s
ankle. This device would transmit a signal to another device located within the
defendant’s place of residence. If the defendant attempted to tamper with the tag or
moved outside a set proximity from the home-based monitoring device, the authorities or
monitoring company were immediately notified. With the system’s immediate
notification of provisional release violations, respondents can act quickly act to
apprehend the defendant.31 In recent years GPS-based ankle bracelets have been
introduced. These allow the defendants to be tracked at all times without the use of a
home monitoring device.32 The disadvantage of ankle bracelets is that they are
extremely limited in their ability to restrain defendants from fleeing. If a defendant
removes the bracelet, or leaves his or her allowed proximity, the bracelet can only notify
the authorities. A defendant who is able to move quickly could easily evade the
authorities.
Provisional release and electronic monitoring have helped reduce penitentiary
overcrowding; there are other benefits to these systems as well. Studies have indicated
that provisional release systems can help reduce the costs associated with imprisonment.
31

Id.

32

See Pro Tech GPS available at http://www.ptm.com; Jemtec Electronic Monitoring, available at
http://www.jemtec.ca
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It can cost legal systems hundreds of dollars a day to imprison an individual, but
outsourcing the defendant to a provisional release system can cut confinement costs
considerably.33 These cost savings are achieved because special needs, medical
requirements, utilities, meals, staffing, and prison cells need not be provided for by the
state. Defendants often continue to take care of their own needs through court-approved
private appointments. Another substantial benefit associated with provisional release
systems is a lower repeat offense rate.34 Repeat offense rates tend to be twenty five
percent lower for those who are on electronic monitoring, than for those who are
provisionally released without such electronic monitoring.35

III.

Legal Discussion

Provisional release in the ICTR and ICTY:
In the ICTR provisional release is extremely limited by the courts restrictions on
its use. In the ICTY provisional release has been granted to twenty-three detainees since
1999. In order to gain provisional release the accused defendant must prove that he or
she meets the three factor test: (1) that there was a trusted host country willing to
transport the detainee back to the tribunal; (2) That the detainee would reappear before
the tribunal if released; (3) That the detainee would not pose any danger to victims,

33

See Electronic monitoring of released prisoners: an evaluation of the Home Detention Curfew scheme,
supra note , [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

34
35

Id.
Id.
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witnesses or others if released. Because tribunal defendants are charged with serious
crimes (such as genocide and crimes against humanity) the burden is on the defendant,
unlike in domestic minor infraction cases where the burden is typically on the
prosecution to prove why provisional release should not be granted. Therefore, in the
ICTR and ICTY cases, the defense must prove the willingness of the defendant to return
to the court for trial, must guarantee that the defendant will pose no harm to any victims
or witnesses, and finally must have the guarantee of a host country that the defendant will
be monitored and returned.36

Provisional release in the ICTR:
Given this three-prong test, the appropriateness of provisional release is difficult
to establish for those on trial in Rwanda. The Hutu are generally the individuals who are
on trial. The Hutu were in power prior to the 1994 genocide that spurred the creation of
the tribunal.37 In 1994 the Hutu massacred over 900,000 Tutsi citizens. The homeland
for both the Hutu and the Tutsi’s was Rwanda; but the Tutsi are now in power and have
little inclination to provide hosting to these detainees. In fact these defendants could be
subject to retaliation by Tutsi or other citizens within Rwanda if they were to be released
there. The difficulty in finding hosting for any provisionally released detainee is best
demonstrated by the as demonstrated in the Ignance Bagilishema case.38 Bagilishema

36

See ICTR Rule 65 (B), [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

37

See Rwandan Genocide, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwanda_genocide

38

See Prosecutor v. Bagilishesma, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Decision Acquitting the Accused of All
Charges and Ordering Immediate Release (June 7, 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
5]; Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, page 7, (2003) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
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was charged with many counts of genocide and crimes against humanity. In June 2001
the ICTR unanimously acquitted Bagilishema from all charges; he was declared a free
man on that day. The prosecution appealed the verdict, but Bagilishema was free to go
while the appeal ran its course. Despite having been acquitted in June 2001, it took the
ICTR four months to locate a willing host and transport Bagilishema there.39 Every
nation initially contacted by the ICTR declined to accept Bagilishema, the ICTR asked
France a second time to reconsider. In October 2001 France finally relented and
permitted Bagilishema to live in France while his case was under appeal.
Any pre-trial provisional release program must look realistically at the fact that it
took four months to find a country willing to accept a detainee who was cleared of all
charges; one can only imagine the difficulty in trying to secure nations willing to accept
those who still face charges of genocide in the future. The inability of the ICTR to locate
readily available hosting nations for its detainees serves as a substantial obstacle to
implementing a functional pretrial provisional release system.

Provisional Release in the ICTY:
Unlike the ICTR, the ICTY has been able to find host nations willing to accept
detainees. Since the ICTY was created to deal with the conflict between several different
ethnic groups, many of the different detainees in the ICTY are compromised of different
citizenships, unlike those in the ICTR who are mainly from Rwanda. This critical
difference between the ethnicities of the detainees in the ICTY and the ICTR is what
permits the ICTY to readily find host nations for those detainees who qualify for
39

Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, page 7, (2003) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
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provisional release. Many of the detainees’ host nations readily accept the detainees, and
are even proud to receive these perceived “war heroes”. Unlike in the ICTR where
Rwanda has no desire to host the detainees, the ICTY has established trusted
relationships with many of the home countries of the detainees. These countries include
the United Nations mission in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The ICTR lacks its own police force
Because the ICTR does not have its own police force, it is unable to arrest,
monitor, or control detainees in any setting. The Tribunal consistently relies on foreign
nations to help police, transfer, and even detain the defendants. The United Nations
Detention Facility which currently holds the detainees is accommodated by Tanzania.
The Tribunal would not have the ability to police detainees who were provisionally
released. Any monitoring efforts would necessarily need to be managed by any host
nation willing to accept the detainees.
Assuming that the ICTR could find host nations willing to accept these
defendants, would the ICTR be able to require similar monitoring systems in each
country? It would be extremely difficult to get different countries to have similarly
reliable tracking systems. The most suitable system would be a GPS electronic tracker;
this would allow the defendant to be tracked via a satellite through a central tracking
system. A GPS tracking system would allow a centralized tracking monitor to know the
location of provisionally released detainees twenty four hours a day. However this
system does little to enforce a return to trial or ensure the safety of witnesses. If the
defendant were to remove the bracelet and flee, the tribunal would have few options

14

when it came to recapturing the defendant. They would need to rely on authorities of
other nations to assist in relocating the defendant, since they do not have their own police
force to respond to any fleeing violations. Furthermore the tribunal currently has no rules
in place to punish those who flee; there would be no repercussions and thus little
incentive for any defendant to comply with orders of the tribunal.

The ICTY Can Rely on Trusted Host Nations
The ICTY has the fortune of being able to provisionally release detainees to
nearby nations which have a trusted relationship with the tribunal. As a result of the
trusted relationships, the ICTY is able to rely on the statements from authorities in those
nations promising to monitor and return the defendants when the tribunal makes the
request. Although the ICTY also lacks its own police force, the ability to rely on
authorities in other nearby nations helps to relieve a lot of concern over the monitoring
and enforcement of any detainees’ provisional release. Many of the European nations
surrounding the ICTY have contemporary law enforcement agencies; these systems
provide some enforcement power against provisionally released detainees.

Do the economic benefits justify release?
The ICTR Tribunal receives its funding from the UN; it also has received a
substantial sum in supplementary funds and resources from member nations.40 Currently
the detention facility is not over crowded; it was constructed to hold eighty-nine

40

See ICTR] General Information, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htm
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
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individuals, far more than the sixty detainees currently under detention.41 Over the last
few years the Tribunal has acted to define its roadmap for concluding the trials. Trials
take an average of sixty-two court room days per detainee, and take years of preparatory
work before the trial is actually read to proceed. This makes trials themselves an
expensive proposition.
If the ICTR were to implement electronic monitoring of pre-trial provisionally
released detainees, the Tribunal would need to spend substantial resources to create a
standardized tracking system, and it would be even more costly if this system were
implemented in several different host countries. If the host countries were to spend the
money, or use their existing systems, standards would not be uniform, and the tribunal
would be unlikely to control or specify the exact systems to be used. Thus, many factors
currently suggest that provisional release for detainees is inappropriate in the ICTR.
Given the hardship in bringing these individuals back to the Tribunal for trial, the stated
timeline indicating the remaining detainees will go to trial in the next few years, and the
existence of sufficient space to host these detainees, there seem to be few substantial
benefits for the Tribunal if they were to provisionally release the detainees.

Resources Should be Used to Maximize Trial Speed
The resources that would be required to create new electronic monitoring, or
integrate Tribunal operations with other existing tracking systems are better used in
supplying the Tribunal’s regular operations with additional resources. Instead of
spending time and money on a temporary system which would be used only for a few
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years, the resources would be much better applied towards hiring more judges,
prosecutors, or support teams to help accelerate the rate at which these defendants go to
trial.42 Most of these detainees have already been in custody for years; at this point the
Tribunal owes them the duty of the quickest route to a trial. For the Tribunal and
prosecutors to spend time negotiating with potential hosting nations, their police forces,
and manufacturers of tracking systems, and then to spend time and resources transferring
detainees around the world; would be an extreme misallocation of precious resources.
Despite the severity of the crimes these detainees are accused of committing, they are
entitled under international human rights law to a speedy trial.43 Any attempts by the
tribunal at this point, in the final hours of the tribunal’s existence to begin to recognize
the detainee’s rights to provisional release seem to be misplaced. Any efforts should be
put towards accelerating the pace at which these defendants will be tried, and to
guarantee that they do not have to wait any longer than is necessary.

IV. Implications for Future International Criminal Tribunals
Provisional release with electronic monitoring can in principle provide assistance
in enforcing provisional release rules of future ICTs. The provisional release permitted in
the ICTY indicates a growing acceptance of provisional release in the international
tribunal setting, even when the crimes are of egregious nature. The lack of provisional
release in the ICTR also demonstrates tribunal situations where provisional release is not
readily available or feasible. Future international criminal tribunals can compare the fact
patterns of each tribunal against those of the ICTY and the ICTR to determine the
42

See Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, page 7, (2003) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
43
I.d., page 2,

17

viability of provisional release with electronic monitoring for their detainees. The
Tribunals should look, for example, at the nationality of the detainees, and determine the
ease with which a host country can be found. The ICTR demonstrates the difficulty in
locating host countries, and how that severely limits the ability of any provisional release
of detainees. The varied nationalities of the ICTY detainees and the varied locations in
which the aggressions occurred, have allowed the detainees readily available host
nations. Future Tribunals should determine the feasibility of implementing a provisional
release system based on the availability of host nations for the detainees. If host nations
are not readily available, the court should not expend substantial amounts resources to
attempt to find placement or arrange for tracking systems.
V. Conclusions
Provisional release is relatively new in international criminal law. As the ICTY
continues to conclude its proceedings, provisional release is continuously used to allow
twenty-three of the defendants to live outside of the UN detention center. Electronic
monitoring and ankle bracelets could help the ICTY confirm that the detainees are indeed
abiding by the Tribunals release conditions. GPS ankle bracelets are a relatively cheap
way for the tribunal to track the location of defendants and ensure that they are where the
host nations say they are, and they are not interfering with witnesses or victims.
However, provisional release and electronic monitoring would not be easily
implemented for the ICTR detainees. The lack of a readily available host nation prevents
the ICTR detainees from meeting the Tribunals three prong test for provisional release.
Ankle bracelets and electronic monitoring cannot enforce or capture a defendant, because
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the ICTR lacks a police force, detainees can not be released without the guarantee of
provisional release enforcement by a host country.
Future criminal tribunals can determine the applicability of provisional release by
comparing their detainees’ status to those of the ICTR and the ICTY. Those that are
closer in fact patterns to the ICTY can if they qualify be provisionally released; those
closer in fact patterns to the ICTR will be less likely to be eligible for provisional release.
Electronic monitoring and ankle bracelets should be viewed only as an aid to
enforcement by the nations who provisionally host the defendant. These devices are used
to alleviate overcrowding in the penitentiary systems in most countries; they are not
generally used in enforcement of primary punishment for capital crimes. These systems
are not able to physically restrain detainees, and the lack of ICT police force would make
it very difficult to recover any detainee who might flee. Electronic monitoring in the
domestic setting has the side effect of reducing repeat offenses by those on provisional
release, but this benefit is not likely to carry over to ICT detainees. Finally it should be
noted again that provisional release with electronic monitoring electronic monitoring and
provisional release , and the types of crimes provisional release is normally not used for
capital crimes, or those crimes as serious as the ones before an International Criminal
Tribunal.
Electronic monitoring could have a place in international criminal provisional
release, but the benefits should not be overly relied on. The limited enforcement of
release requirements, difficulty of recapturing detainees who flee, and protection of
witnesses or victims are still very real problems. Therefore every aspect of a detainee’s
behavior needs to be considered before provisional release is granted.
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